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NOTES
ABILITY OF LEGATEE-HUSBAND TO ADOPT WIFE TO
BRING HER WITHIN TERMS OF WILL
In her will creating a testamentary trust a mother directed that one
half of the trust corpus should be paid to her son during his life, re-
mainder to the son's "heirs at law" according to the law of descent
and distribution in force at the time of his death, but if he had no
"heirs at law" the property was to pass to certain designated institu-
tions. The son died without children of his own, but at age fifty-eight
had adopted his forty-five year old wife to bring her within the term
"heir at law." The circuit court upheld the adoption, thus permitting
the "wife-daughter" to inherit. The court of appeals, reviewing the
statute which provided for the adoption of "any person," rejected the
contention that the relationship created violated public policy and
affirmed the circuit court's decision.1
Adoption was not known to the common law2 and has arisen in the
United States only where there has been statutory authority2 Massa-
1. Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
The Kentucky statutes of inheritance give the net personal estate of a male
decedent to his child and widow proportionately. If there is no child or other
relative capable of taking under the statutes, his widow nevertheless receives
only a half share. Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 391.030, 392.020 (1956). Thus, had there
been no adoption in the principal case, the son's widow would have taken as an
"heir at law" only one half of the trust remainder, and under the terms of the
will the other one half of the remainder would have gone to the designated
institutions. The effect of the adoption was to make the wife an heir at law
not only as a widow but also as a child, thereby entitling her to the entire re-
mainder of the estate.
2. This fact has been stated by numerous authorities. See, e.g., In re Thornes's
Estate, 155 N.Y. 140, 49 N.E. 661 (1898); Madden, Domestic Relations 355
(1931). This was undoubtedly brought about by the inordinately high regard
that the English had for relationship by consanguinity. Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 743, 745 (1956). It should be
noted, however, that adoption is not a creature of modern society; it was known
to the Romans and Athenians, and was even recognized in the Old Testament.
Thus, when Joseph went to visit his father Jacob in the land of Goshen, he
brought with him his two Egyptian sons, whom Jacob subsequently adopted.
Genesis, 41: 50-52. Approximately 2,000 years prior to the birth of Christ the
following statement was made in the Code of Hammurabi: "If a man take a
child in his name, adopt and rear him as a son, this grown up son may not be
demanded back." Huard, op. cit. supra at 744. For an excellent and comprehen-
sive history of adoption, see Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906).
3. In re Thompson's Adoption, 290 Pa. 586, 139 Atl. 737 (1927). There seems
to be little question that the adoption laws in this country were derived largely
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chusetts, 4 generally accredited with having enacted the first adoption
statute in this country, declared as its primary purpose furtherance
of the general welfare of the child. But other states such as Texas;
and Alabama, 6 whose statutes were enacted approximately at the
same time, specified as their primary purpose the creation of legal
heirs.7 This differentiation in purpose-the general welfare of the
child as opposed to the creation of heirs-is undoubtedly the basis for
a great deal of the disparity between the adoption statutes in this
country today.,
The principal case raises three important problems concerning
adoption which, because of the above disparity, can be resolved only
by examining the different types of adoption statutes. The problems
may be stated as follows: (1) May an adult be adopted? (2) What
effect, if any, will marriage-prohibitory and incest statutes have in
determining whether a wife may be adopted by her husband? (3) Is
an adult wife, who has been adopted by her husband, to be included in
a will of one other than the adopter when the will provides for dis-
tribution to "heirs at law" of the adopter?
The problem whether adults may be adopted can best be analyzed
by looking at the interpretations that have been reached under differ-
ently worded statutes.9 Generally the statutes can be divided into four
classes:10 (1) statutes which specifically provide that only "minor
children" may be adopted; (2) statutes which specifically provide that
both "minors" and "adults" may be adopted; (3) statutes which pro-
vide for the adoption of "any person" but make no specific reference
to the adoption of adults; and (4) statutes which make no specific
from Roman civil law. See Brosman, The Law of Adoption, 22 Col. L. Rev.
332 (1922).
4. Mass. Acts & Resolves c. 324 (1851).
5. Tex. Gen. Stat. Law 33 (1859).
6. Ala. Code § 385 (1852).
7. The sole purpose of Roman adoption was to perpetuate the family by the
creation of heirs. The Texas and Alabama statutes were thus patterned closely
after the Roman civil law. See Fairley, Inheritance Rights Consequent To
Adoptions, 29 N.C.L. Rev. 227, 228 (1951); Kuhlman, Intestate Succession By
And From The Adopted Child, 28 Wash. U.L.Q. 221, 222 (1943).
8. See Kuhlman, supra note 7, at 224-25.
9. Many cases that will subsequently be cited in this note to illustrate various
interpretations reached under diversely phrased statutes were decided under
statutes that are now superseded. Reference to these cases, however, should
be helpful for understanding the problems in jurisdictions which presently have
statutes worded the same as or similar to those under which the cases were
decided. A reference to the chart, set out in an appendix at notes 47-95 infra,
should prove of assistance in determining the phraseology presently used in
the statute of any particular state.
10. See chart supported by notes 47-95 infra.
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provision concerning the adoptability of adults but provide for the
adoption of a "child" or "children."
If the designation in the statute provides only for the adoption of a
minor child, it is manifest that an adult may not be adopted."1 It is
also very clear from the wording of the second 12 and third13 groups
that adults and minors both may be adopted. The fourth category is
the one that has generally caused confusion. Regarding this group
the majority of courts have taken the view that the word "child,"
rather than connoting a filial relationship, is used in contrast to the
word "parent" and thus includes an adult. 4 A few courts, however,
have taken the position that the word "child" should be given its
literal meaning and that adults are thereby excluded.
5
It is submitted that the statutes which allow the adoption only of
minor children, as did the early Massachusetts statute, must have as
their underlying justification the creation of a family relationship;
otherwise, the exclusion of adults would as a rule be meaningless.
Conversely, statutes which permit the adoption of adults must con-
template the creation of heirs as one purpose of the statute, for other-
wise there would generally be no point in authorizing adoption of
adults.'6
The second problem which must be considered is whether the rela-
tionship created by a husband adopting his wife as a daughter offends
public policy.' 7 This contention, strongly urged by the defense in the
11. McCollister v. Yard, 90 Iowa 621, 57 N.W. 447 (1894).
12. Succession of Caldwell, 114 La. 195, 38 So. 140 (1905).
13. The statutory intent in these types of statutes has generally been so
apparent that there has been very little litigation concerning them.
14. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373 (1907); State
ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun, 330 Mo. 1172, 52 S.W.2d 742 (1932).
15. First Nat'l Bank v. Mott, 101 Fla. 1224, 133 So. 78 (1931); Williams v.
Knight, 18 R.I. 333, 27 Atl. 210 (1893).
16. The fact that some states permit the adoption of adults has led to some
bizarre results. For example, in one case a 70 year old man was allowed to adopt
three other men whose ages were 43, 39, and 25. Collamore v. Learned, 171 Mass.
99, 50 N.E. 518 (1898). In another case a bachelor was allowed to adopt his
married stenographer. Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S.W. 896 (1927).
However, the adoption of an adult wife by her husband is most unusual, if not
unique to the Bedinger case.
17. The words "public policy" are not easy to define with precision. Generally,
the courts have described public policy as that principle of law declaring that
one shall not do what is injurious to the public or the public good, even though
his acts are not strictly illegal. Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196
S.W.2d 615 (1946). An excellent definition is found in Black's Law Dictionary
(4th ed. 1951), where it is said:
The term "policy," as applied to a . . . rule of law . . . refers to its
probable effect, tendency or object, considered with reference to the
social or political well-being of the state. Thus certain classes of acts
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principal case, 8 was based on the implication that the marriage was
incestuous.19 The court refuted this argument by stating that Ken-
tucky incest and marriage-prohibitory statutes apply only to marriage
and fornication among blood relatives. 20 What would be the result,
however, if an adoption such as that consummated in the principal
case should be undertaken in a jurisdiction where marriage-prohibi-
tory or incest statutes are held applicable to all relatives-blood or
otherwise?
Although many jurisdictions provide for the inclusion of non-blood
relatives, such as stepchildren and daughters-in-law, within the terms
of their marriage-prohibitory and incest statutes,2" there is very little
are said to be "against public policy," when the law refuses to enforce
or recognize them, on the ground that they have a mischievous tendency,
so as to be injurious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality
or immorality.
Public policy is primarily determined by the legislature. 12 Am. Jur., Con-
tracts § 171 (1938). However, when the legislature has not spoken, the courts
may determine public policy whenever the need arises. Reed v. Jackson County,
346 Mo. 720, 142 S.W.2d 862 (1940). See also Winfield, Public Policy in the
English Common Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (1928).
18. 302 S.W.2d at 600.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. Cf. Burdue v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 428, 138 S.W. 296 (1911).
21. Marriage-prohibitory statutes declare what marriages are to be void
or voidable, but usually do not include any criminal penalties. For example, a
marriage-prohibitory statute of Maryland reads as follows:
A man shall not marry: His grandmother, His grandfather's wife, His
wife's grandmother, His father's sister, His mother's sister, His mother,
His stepmother, His wife's mother, His daughter, His wife's daughter,
His son's wife, His sister, His son's daughter, His daughter's daughter,
His son's son's wife, His daughter's son's wife, His wife's son's daughter,
His wife's daughter's daughter, His brother's daughter, His sister's
daughter.
Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 62, § 2 (1951).
Incest statutes provide criminal sanctions against marriage or fornication
between certain designated relatives. For example, the Maryland incest statute
reads as follows:
Every person who shall knowingly have carnal knowledge of another
person, being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages
are prohibited by law in this State, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a term not less than one nor more than ten years, in the
discretion of the court.
Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 27, § 401 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that not all marriages forbidden by the marriage-prohibitory
statutes are deemed incestuous. Thus, according to the Maryland incest statute
it is only those marriages proscribed by the marriage-prohibitory statute and
between parties having a blood relationship that are deemed criminal.
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authority whether an adopted child can be so included.22 In one
Mississippi case, where the statute prohibited marriage to a "daugh-
ter" or "stepdaughter," the court held that an adopted child was not
encompassed by the statute.2' However, in an early California case
the court used "stepdaughter" and "adopted daughter" in the same
clause, 24 implying that had the applicable statute encompassed a step-
daughter it would have also included an adopted daughter. Sociolo-
gists have long advocated that legislatures and courts broaden their
adoption statutes by express legislation or by more liberal interpreta-
tion of present statutes.2 5 They would desire to have a "complete
assimilation" of the adoptee into the adopting family.28 "Complete
assimilation" would entail treating the adopted child exactly the same
as a natural child, thus bringing the adopted child within the mar-
riage-prohibitory and incest statutes.
It should be noted that the "complete assimilation" theory of the
sociologists presupposes that the primary purpose of adotion is to
foster the general welfare of the child. However, as has been demon-
strated above in the discussion on adoption of adults, the primary pur-
pose of adoption may be the creation of heirs .2 ' This is especially true
in the principal case, where the situation was not one where a father
married his adopted daughter but one where a man, already married,
adopted his wife. In such a situation it is clear that the adoption is
primarily if not solely for inheritance purposes, so that regardless of
what position is taken on the "complete assimilation" doctrine, it is
unrealistic to label this type of marriage incestuous.
It is submitted that even if an adopted child is included within the
incest or marriage-prohibitory statutes by express legislation or ju-
dicial interpretation, the criminal sanctions imposed by these statutes
22. See Annot., 151 A.L.R. 1146 (1944).
23. State v. Lee, 196 Miss. 311, 17 So. 2d 277 (1944).
24. People v. Kaiser, 119 Cal. 456, 457, 51 Pac. 702, 703 (1897).
25. See Kuhlman, supra note 7, at 245, 248; Merrill, Toward Uniformity
in Adoption Law, 40 Iowa L. Rev. 299, 300 (1955); Newbold, Jurisdictional
and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11 Minn. L. Rev. 605 (1927).
26. The Uniform Adoption Act, § 12(2), comes very close to providing for a
"complete assimilation" of the adoptee into the adopting family.
27. See text supported by notes 2-8 supra.
An example illustrating the consequences of failing to distinguish between
the two purposes of adoption statutes is found in Missouri. The Missouri statute,
attempting to effect a complete assimilation of the child into the adopting family,
provides that an adopted child shall be considered an "heir of the body." Under
this statute an adult adopted strictly for inheritance purposes would be deemed
an "heir of the body." See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090 (1949). Had more con-
sideration been given to the dual purpose of adoption statutes, this provision
of the Missouri statute might well have been drafted to apply only to minor
children.
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will not be enforced when the purpose of the adoption is, as in the
Bedinger case, solely for creation of heirs. It is also submitted, how-
ever, that once an adopted child is held includible within the incest
statutes the court will seize this opportunity to nullify the type of
relationship created in the principal case on the ground that it offends
public policy-even though the relationship's sole purpose is clearly
to establish inheritance rights. The reason courts will be anxious to
declare that an adoption of a wife by her husband contravenes public
policy is not only because it allows the adopter to defeat the testator's
intent but because it invites conflicts with other types of laws, such
as those of descent. 28 For example, will a wife adopted as a daughter
by her husband take a widow's share, a child's share, or both, in the
estate of her husband-father? Consider also that many inheritance
statutes expressly or impliedly provide that an adoptee shall not in-
herit from his natural parents. 29 Does this provision mean that a
daughter-wife loses the right to take from her natural parents, or will
she in her dual capacity be treated as two separate entities and be able
to claim, on the one hand, as both daughter and wife of her husband-
father, and on the other hand, as the daughter of her natural parents?
With the above discussion in mind, the chart appearing in an ap-
pendix beginning on page 106 should be a useful guide in determining
the probabilities of a wife being adopted by her husband in a particu-
lar state. The basic premise upon which the chart is based is that those
states whose marriage-prohibitory and incest statutes presently con-
tain provisions prohibiting marriage or fornication between certain
non-blood relatives will be the first willing to bring an adopted child
within these statutes. The use of the chart may be illustrated as
follows: if, as in Alabama,' adoption is limited to minor children, an
adult wife may not be adopted; if, as in Connecticut, 31 an adult can
be adopted but there is a specific prohibition against adopting a wife,
an adult wife may not be adopted; if, as in Iowa, 2 an adult may be
adopted and there is no express statutory prohibition against adopting
a wife, but both the marriage-prohibitory and incest statutes include
non-blood relatives within their terms, the adoption of an adult wife
will probably be declared against public policy; if, as in Maryland 33 or
Indiana,3 there is no express statutory prohibition against the adop-
tion of an adult wife, but either the marriage-prohibitory or the incest
28. This was clearly pointed out by the dissenting opinion in the principal
case. See 302 S.W.2d at 601.
29. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090 (1949).
30. See chart supported by note 47 infra.
31. See chart supported by note 52 infra.
32. See chart supported by note 60 infra.
33. See chart supported by note 65 infra.
34. See chart supported by note 59 infra.
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statute proscribes marriages between non-blood relatives, it is still
probable that the adoption of a wife by her husband will be declared
against public policy; if, as in Kentucky, 35 there is no express prohibi-
tion against the adoption of an adult wife and neither the marriage-
prohibitory nor incest statute prohibits marriage or fornication be-
tween non-blood relatives, then, as was seen in the principal case, it
is distinctly possible that adoption of an adult wife by her husband
will be sustained.
Whether an adoptee should be included in the will of a person other
than the adopter 36 when the terms of distribution used are "children,"
"issue," "heirs at law," or words of similar import, is not a new prob-
lem.-7 Provisions for the right of an adoptee to inherit from his
adopter are found in every jurisdiction. 8 However, the right of an
adopted child to take under the will of one other than the adopter
does not necessarily concern the child's right to inherit, but comprises
a question of the intent of the testator.3 9 If a child is adopted before
execution of the will it is presumed that the testator intended to
include the adoptee unless specific words of exclusion show other-
wise.4' Similarly, when a child is adopted after the will is executed
but before the testator's death, it will be presumed that the testator
intended to include the adopted child in the will; otherwise, he would
have changed the will specifically to exclude the adoptee.4i However,
when the adoption occurs after the testator's death, as in the Bedinger
case, courts have had more difficulty. In this last type of situation the
35. See chart supported by note 62 infra.
36. Whether an adult wife adopted by her husband would be includible as a
"child" in the husband's own bequest to his children is not considered in this
note, because a man generally would not adopt his wife to leave property to her
as a "child" when he could much more easily change his will to include her
specifically as his wife. It is conceivable, however, that a husband might want to
adopt his wife when there is a possibility that his will naming his wife as sole
beneficiary might be contested. For example, the laws of intestacy of a par-
ticular jurisdiction might provide that a widow takes a half share and a
surviving child takes the remaining half share. Without any adoption, the
testator's widow would take only a half share if the will was successfully con-
tested, but if she were also an adopted "child" the contestants would have to
upset a collateral court decree before they could benefit from breaking the will.
It would appear in this type of situation, however, that a testator could just
as easily create an inter vivos trust to accomplish his purpose instead of re-
sorting to more complicated adoption procedures.
37. See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 670 (1943).
38. Vernier, 4 American Family Laws § 262 (1936).
39. Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611, 98 S.W.2d 672 (1936).
40. In re McEvan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A.2d 340 (1940); In re Horn's Will,
256 N.Y. 294, 176 N.E. 399 (1931).
41. Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899 (1934).
. 103NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
weight of authority holds that an adopted child is not includible within
the terms "children" or "issue" when used in a will of a person other
than the adopter, because these words connote a blood relationship. 42
If an adopted child is not included within the terms "children" or
"issue," it is clear that an adopted adult or an adopted adult wife also
will not be included.
In most jurisdictions courts will presume that a testator using the
words "heirs" or "heirs at law" intended them to be interpreted by
reference to the state's descent and distribution statutes, unless he
manifested a contrary intent. 3 This presumption may also include
adopted children within the meaning of the words "heirs" or "heirs at
law," for as was observed before, every jurisdiction provides that an
adoptee is an "heir" of his adopting parent.44 Quite understandably,
then, the presumption that a testator intended the adopted child of a
legatee to inherit as an "heir at law" will be stronger if, as in the
Bedinger case, the testator expressly provided that "heirs" should be
determined according to the descent and distribution statutes in force
at the time of the legatee's death.4r Although the foregoing are os-
tensibly the main criteria that courts use to determine the testator's
intent when a limitation such as "heir" or "heir at law" is used, many
courts find it easier to allow an adoptee to take under the will of one
other than the adopter when the adoption statute provides that the
adoptee can take through as well as from his adopter.4 It is submitted
that courts in jurisdictions whose statutes do not expressly allow the
adoptee to inherit through his adopter will use this omision as a
handy peg should they decide to exclude an adoptee wife-daughter as
outside the testator's intent.
In conclusion, it appears that Kentucky is an ideal state for the
situation of a husband adopting his wife to arise, because the Ken-
tucky statutes are particularly amenable to permitting such a relation-
42. See, e.g., Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W.2d 660 (1941); Parker
v. Carpenter, 77 N.H. 453, 92 Atl. 955 (1915); In re Puterbaugh's Estate, 261
Pa. 235, 104 Atl. 601 (1918). But see the present Missouri statute which includes
an adopted child within the term "heir of the body." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.090
(1949).
43. Casner, Construction of Gifts to "Heirs" and the Like, 53 Harv. L. Rev.
207, 209 (1939). It is there pointed out that this presumption by courts is
necessary, since nowadays the words "heirs" and "heirs at law" have only that
meaning which the legislature ascribes to them.
44. See note 38 supra.
45. Kemp v. New York Produce Exchange, 34 App. Div. 175, 54 N.Y. Supp.
678 (2d Dep't. 1898); In re Bate's Will, 173 Misc. 703, 19 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Surr.
Ct. 1940).
46. In re Estate of Clarke, 125 Neb. 625, 251 N.W. 279 (1933). Compare




ship. Variances from the pattern of the Kentucky statutes, however,
may give rise to a different result, especially because most courts will
be anxious to avoid the conflicts that might arise between adoption
statutes and other laws, such as those of descent. Courts also will be
hesitant to allow the adopter to create artificial relationships tending
to frustrate the intent of the testator. Therefore, it is suggested that
in the future, courts faced with this problem, avoid the result of the
principal case, on the premise that it offends public policy.
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SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR USE IN DETERMINING WHETHER A
WIFE MAY BE ADOPTED BY HER HUSBAND IN A PARTICULAR STATE
Statutory Wording Persons Prohibits Adoption Prohibits Designates AsAs To Who May Be Included Of Certain Relatives Marriage Incestuous
Adopted Between Certain Fornication
Relatives Other Between CertainState Than Those Relatives Other
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SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR UsE IN DETERMINING WHETHER A
WiFE MAY BE ADOPTED BY HER HusAND IN A PARMCULAR STATE
Statutory Wording Persons Prohibits Adoption Prohibits Designates As
As To Who May Be Included Of Certain Relatives Marriage Incestuous
Adopted Between Certain Fornication
Relatives Other Between Certain
State Than Those Relatives Other
Related By Than Those
Blood Related By
Blood
Oklahoma "minor child" or minor child no yes no"
"female age 18 to and adult
25" or "male age female 18 to
21 to 25" 25 and adult
male 21 to
25
Oregon any person may minor child no no no'
"another" and adult
Pennsyl- "minor or an minor child no yes yes
08
vania adult" and adult
Rhode "any person" minor child no yes no"s
Island and adult
South "child" minor child no yes yes'
Carolina and adult
South "minor child" minor child no yes no"
Dakota
Tennessee "any person" minor child no yes yes0
and adult
Texas "minor child" and minor child no yes yes"
"adult person" and adult
Utah "child" minor child no no no'
and adult
Vermont "any other person" minor child no yes yes'
and adult
Virginia "minor child" and minor child no yes yes 1
adult "step-child" and adult
step-child
Washington "any person" minor child no no no"
and adult
West "minor child" or minor child no yes no3
Virginia "adult" and adult
Wisconsin "adult" and minor child no no no9
"minor" and adult




47. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 27, § 1; tit. 34, § 1; tit. 14, § 325 (1940).
48. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-101, 25-101, 13471 (1956).
49. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 56-121, 41-811, 55-103 (1947).
50. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 221-22, 59 (Deering 1949); Cal. Code Ann. P.C. § 285
(Deering 1949).
51. Colo. Rev. Stat. c. 4, art. 1, § 3; c. 40, art. 9, § 5; c. 90, art. 1, § 2 (1953);
52. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 2904 (Supp. 1955); §§ 6871, 6872, 8551, 7301
(1949).
53. Del. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 903, 101; tit. 11, § 591 (1953).
54. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-212 (Supp. 1956); §§ 22-1901, 30-101 (1951).
55. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 72.11, 72.34 (Supp. 1957); § 741.21 (1944).
56. Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 74-401, 74-420 (Supp. 1955); §§ 53-102, 53-105 (1949).
57. Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1501 (Supp. 1957); §§ 18-6602, 32-205-06 (1948).
58. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 4, § 1; c. 89, § 1 (1957).
59. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-115 (Burns Supp. 1957); § 3-124 (Burns 1946); §
10-4206 (Burns 1956); § 44-205 (Burns 1952).
60. Iowa Code Ann. § 600.1 (Supp. 1957); §§ 704.1, 595.19 (1950).
61. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-2101, 21-906, 23-102 (1949).
62. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 199.470, 405.390, 436.060, 402.010 (Baldwin 1955).
63. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8 9:422, 9:461, 14:78 (1950); La. Civ. Code Amn.
art. 94 (West 1952).
64. Me. Rev. Stat. c. 158, § 36; c. 134, § 2; c. 166, § 1 (1954).
65. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 16, § 80; art. 27, § 401; art. 62, § 2 (1951).
66. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 210, § 1; c. 272, § 17; c. 207, § 1 (1956).
67. Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 27.3178 (542), 28.565, 25.3 (1957).
68. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 617.13, 517.03 (West 1956); § 259.22 (West Supp.
1957).
69. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1269.02, 2000, 457 (1942).
70. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 453.010, 563.220, 451.020 (1949).
71. Mont. Rev. Code §§ 61-139, 48-105, 94-705 (1947); § 61-202 (Supp. 1957).
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